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Abstract
This paper studies regime dependence in macroeconomic dynamics in the U.S. using a threshold
vector autoregressive model in which endogenous regime switches are triggered by the inﬂation rate.
The model separates a high from a low inﬂation regime with both regimes being strongly persistent.
Generalized impulse response functions highlight important across-regime diﬀerences in the responses
of the economy to monetary policy and inﬂation shocks. Simulating both regimes with individual
structural equations interchanged shows a change in inﬂation dynamics to be the most important
source of the transition of the U.S. economy from the high into the low inﬂation state while the
change in the monetary policy reaction functions has only very little eﬀect. Our results indicate
that favorable changes in the economic structure and less frequent and smaller shocks are important
explanations for the observed decline in U.S. macroeconomic volatility since the mid 1980s.
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1 Introduction
An important strand in the empirical literature on macroeconomic dynamics has used
vector autoregressive (VAR) models to study the dynamic interrelations between macroe-
conomic variables. For example, since the mid 1990s a very succesful research program
has investigated the macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy. These eﬀects have been
identiﬁed by estimating the dynamic responses of output, inﬂation and other variables
to “monetary policy shocks”.1 More recently, vector autoregressive models have been
used to investigate the causes of the decline in macroeconomic volatility in the U.S.
after the mid 1980s (e.g. Gordon, 2005, Stock and Watson, 2003).
This paper uses the standard “monetary policy” VAR model modiﬁed by threshold
eﬀects to study regime-dependent changes in U.S. Our results contribute to the recent
discussion about the causes of the decline in macroeconomic volatility in the U.S. after
the mid 1980s. One explanation focuses on beneﬁcial changes in the structure of the
U.S. economy making it less vulnerable to shocks. Another explanation is that size
and frequency of shocks aﬀecting the U.S. economy declined in this period. These ﬁrst
two explanations are often labelled as “good luck” while the next ones represent “good
policy”. These argue that the decline in macroeconomic volatility is the eﬀect of im-
provements in the Fed’s monetary policy, represented by an improved monetary policy
reaction function and by a reduction in size and frequency of monetary policy shocks,
which are the deviations from the monetary policy rule, i.e. the policy residuals. In
the ﬁrst case, the improvement is attributed to the systematic component of monetary
policy, in the second case to the unsystematic component.
This paper shows that the time period of this “Great Moderation” coincides with one of
the two regimes in the threshold model. Since the multivariate threshold model allows
not only for nonlinearities and regime change in the monetary policy reaction function
but also in the other economic relationships it enables us to investigate the causes
1See Christiano et al. (1999) for a survey.
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of the observed improvements in macroeconomic stability by studying diﬀerences in
the monetary policy reaction functions, in the dynamics of the other macroeconomic
variables, and in the structural shocks across regimes. Important information on the
relative importance of these elements is gained by studying the regime-transition prob-
abilities. Our results indicate that favorable changes in the economic structure and
less frequent and smaller shocks are more important explanations than a signiﬁcant
improvement in systematic monetary policy.
Recent literature has presented evidence on structural change in U.S. macroeconomic
dynamics as represented in VARs. For example, Mojon (2008) argues that shifts in
the mean of the inﬂation equation are important for the estimation of the eﬀects of
monetary policy shocks in the U.S. Instead of allowing for the change of only one
speciﬁc parameter our empirical model allows for more general changes in the structural
relationships in the economy. Other studies have focused on changes in the monetary
policy reaction function of the Federal Reserve within VAR models (e.g. Cogley and
Sargent, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Stock and Watson, 2003).
The approaches discussed so far model changes to structural economic relationships
and to the monetary policy reaction function as exogenous shifts. Instead of being
exogenous these changes might actually be triggered by the state of the economy. In
this paper we focus on the level of inﬂation as the variable which triggers switches
between regimes. For example, the relationship between output and inﬂation (the
Philips curve) and the persistence of inﬂation depend on expected inﬂation and on
the credibility of monetary policy. If high inﬂation erodes this credibility, inﬂation
dynamics can be aﬀected by changes to the level of inﬂation. Changes in the monetary
policy reaction function can also depend on the level of inﬂation as the central bank
might react diﬀerently to shocks depending on the size and direction of the deviation of
inﬂation from its target. For example, Orphanides and Wilcox (2003) and Aksoy et al.
(2006) present a model which results in a target zone for inﬂation. The central bank
only responds to shocks which drive the inﬂation rate outside the target zone. As long as
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the inﬂation rate remains within the target band monetary policy remains passive. This
leads to the monetary policy reaction function being diﬀerent depending on whether
the inﬂation rate is within or outside of the target band. Regime-dependent reactions
of monetary policy might also result from credibility concerns. For example, while
small deviations of the inﬂation rate from its target might not cause a loss in public
conﬁdence in the central bank’s commitment to the inﬂation target, large deviations
might cause the central bank to lose credibility with the public. To avoid this credibility
loss, the central bank might respond more aggressively to sizable inﬂationary excesses
than to small ones (e.g. Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). Uncertainty
about the monetary transmission mechanism might also result in non-linearities in the
central bank’s reaction function (e.g. Meyer et al., 2001; Swanson, 2006).
Apart from these theoretical concerns an additional advantage of using the inﬂation
rate as threshold variable is that, the period of the “Great Moderation” is associated
with a signiﬁcant decline in the level of inﬂation. This allows the threshold VAR
to endogenously associate one regime with this time period if are indeed signiﬁcant
changes in macroeconomic dynamics can be related to this subsample period.
A straightforward way to model nonlinearities like these empirically is the estimation
of a threshold model. Threshold models allow for diﬀerent regimes, i.e. diﬀerent sets of
model parameters. Which regime applies to a given point in time depends on whether a
speciﬁc variable, the threshold variable, exceeds a given threshold value. By introducing
more than one threshold values the model can accommodate more than two regimes.
Univariate threshold autoregressive models have been introduced by Tong (1978) and
Tong and Lim (1980).2 Bunzel and Enders (2010) estimate a nonlinear Taylor rule with
a lagged inﬂation threshold. These models have been extended to a multivariate context
by Tsay (1998) and Balke (2000) who tests for regime dependence in macroeconomic
dynamics based on a threshold VAR using credit growth as threshold variable. In this
paper, we adopt his VAR approach to the study of threshold eﬀects in the standard
2See Tong (1990) for an extensive survey.
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monetary policy VAR for the U.S.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of the threshold
VAR model and its estimation. Section 3 contains the estimation results presents
evidence on regime-dependent dynamics in the U.S. economy. Section 4 concludes
with a discussion of the results.
2 Econometric Methodology
A threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with two regimes can be written as
(Balke, 2000)
Yt = μ
1 + A1Yt + B
1(L)Yt−1 + (μ2 + A2Yt + B2(L)Yt−1)I(ct−d > γ) + ut. (1)
Yt is a vector of N endogenous variables. I is an indicator variable that equals 1
when the threshold variable ct−d exceeds a threshold value γ and 0 otherwise. The
dynamics of Yt follow two diﬀerent regimes dependent on the indicator variable. If
I = 0 the dynamics of the VAR are given by the vector of constants μ1, the matrix
of contemporaneous interaction coeﬃcients A1 and the coeﬃcients in the matrix of lag
polynomials B1(L). If I = 1 the relevant coeﬃcients are μ1+μ2, A1+A2 and B1(L)+
B2(L). ut is a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations.
The (diagonal) variance-covariance matrix of these innovations can also be regime
dependent Σiu, i = 1, 2. By specifying the threshold variable ct as a function of the
variables in Yt the transition between the two regimes is endogenously determined by
the model.
To test for threshold eﬀects the model is estimated by OLS on a grid of possible
threshold values chosen to provide for each regime a number of observations equal to the
number of coeﬃcients in each equation plus 15% of the overall number of observations.
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For each threshold value a Wald statistic is computed and three test statistics for the
null hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects are constructed: (sup-Wald) the maximum of
the Wald statistic over all possible threshold values, (avg-Wald) the average of the
individual Wald statistics, and (exp-Wald) the sum of exponential Wald statistics.
The latter two statistics are suggested by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). Testing for
threshold eﬀects in (1) is complicated by the fact that the threshold parameter γ is
not identiﬁed under the null hypothesis of no threshold eﬀects. In order to obtain
p-values the empirical distributions of the sup-Wald, avg-Wald and exp-Wald statistics
are constructed under the null hypothesis by simulation using the method of Hansen
(1996). The estimate of the threshold value is the one minimizing the log determinant
of the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals.
We use a standard data set commonly applied to VAR studies of monetary policy
in the U.S. It contains quarterly observations on real GDP, the GDP deﬂator and
the monetary aggregate M1. The indicator for monetary policy is the end-of-quarter
Federal Funds Rate.3 Standard VAR studies also include an indicator of commodity
prices (e.g. Christiano et al., 1999).4 We constructed this indicator as the average
annualized inﬂation rates in the price indices for oil (West Texas Intermediate), for
agricultural commodities and for metals.5
In order to identify the coeﬃcients of the contemporaneous relationships in the A-
matrices and the structural shocks we impose a standard recursive causal ordering of
the variables of output growth, inﬂation, commodity price inﬂation, the Federal Funds
3Data was obtained from the FRED II database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.
http://www.stlouisfed.org/fred2
4This variable is included to alleviate the “price puzzle” - an increase in the price level following an
exogenous restrictive monetary policy impulse. On explanation for this surprising result is that the
central bank reacts to leading information signalling a future increase in inﬂation. Including a leading
indicator of future inﬂation such as commodity price inﬂation accounts for endogenous monetary
policy reactions to forecasts of higher inﬂation and thus or reduces the price puzzle (Eichenbaum,
1992). For an in depth discussion, see Hanson (2004)).
5This data is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
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Rate, and the growth rate of the monetary aggregate (e.g. Christiano et al., 1999).
Including non-stationary data in the VAR might lead to spurios non-linearities (Calza
and Sousa, 2005) and might also violate the regularity conditions required to obtain
simulated p-values using the Hansen (1996) technique. Hence we set up the VAR in log
diﬀerences of all variables except for the Federal Funds Rate and include annualized
rates of quarter-to-quarter output growth, inﬂation, commodity price inﬂation and
money growth. The overall estimation period runs from the starting date in Christiano
et al. (1999) which is 1965Q3 to 2007Q2.
3 Results
3.1 Threshold Estimates
The threshold VAR (1) was estimated using the lagged inﬂation rate as the threshold
variable c = π, d = 1. Table 1 presents tests for the null hypothesis of no threshold
eﬀects in the VAR (A2 = B2(L) = 0, μ2 = 0) based on the complete sample from
1965Q3 to 2007Q2.
Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) argue that most of the time variance in
structural VARs is caused by changes in the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks.
To account for this, Panels A and B diﬀer in the way the contemporaneous interaction
coeﬃcients in A1 and A2 and the variance-covariance matrix of the structural VAR
residuals are treated. Panel A assumes A2 = 0 and Σ1u = Σ2u by estimating the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR as being identical in both regimes. Panel
B allows for A2 = 0 and Σ1u = Σ2u by estimating regime-dependent variance-covariance
matrices for the reduced form VAR. The results in both panels show strong evidence for
the presence of threshold eﬀects and arrive at identical estimates of γ. These estimates
are considerably higher than those for the single equation model in Bunzel and Enders
(2010). The smallest value for the log determinant of the variance-covariance matrix
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Table 1: Tests for threshold VAR
Variables: GDP growth, inﬂation, com. inﬂation, Fed Funds Rate, M1 growth
A: No threshold eﬀect in contemporaneous relationships
Estimated
threshold variable Threshold value sup-Wald avg-Wald exp-Wald
INFLATION γ = 4.85 7152.61 1805.84 700.22
Lag=1 LD=9.41 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
B: Threshold eﬀect in contemporaneous relationships
Estimated
threshold variable Threshold value sup-Wald avg-Wald exp-Wald
INFLATION γ = 4.85 1249.53 299.35 619.47
Lag=1 LD=9.34 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NOTES: Sample period is 1965Q3-2007Q2. P-Values in parentheses.
Based on Hansen (1996) with 1000 replications.
of the residuals results for the lagged inﬂation rate in Panel B. Figure 2 shows a plot of
the lagged inﬂation rate and the estimated threshold value. The high inﬂation regime
prevails from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. The low inﬂation regime is associated
with the period now termed as the “Great Moderation”. This division of the sample is
determined endogenously by the empirical model.
« Insert Figure 1 »
3.2 Generalized impulse responses
In standard VAR models the dynamic adjustment of the variables to structurally iden-
tiﬁed shocks is studied by using impulse response functions. Impulse response analysis
in the TVAR model must account for the possibility of the economy switching between
regimes. The construction of the required non-linear or generalized impulse response
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functions is more complicated than in the conventional linear case since the dynamic
behavior of the model depends on both the history of the time series (initial conditions)
and the size of the shocks which might aﬀect the shifts between regimes.
The generalized impulse responses of the variables in Y in period k following a shock are
deﬁned following Koop et al. (1996) as the diﬀerences in the conditional expectations
GIk = E[Yt+k|Ωt−1, ut]− E[Yt+k|Ωt−1]. (2)
Ωt−1 is the information set at time t− 1 and ut is a vector of exogenous shocks which
is typically constructed from an identiﬁed structural shock to one of the variables in
Y .
We construct the non-linear impulse responses using the bootstrap procedure suggested
by Balke (2000). For each initial set of observations Ωt−1 we draw a random vector
of shocks ut+j, j = 0, . . . k from the regression residuals and simulate the model in
order to obtain E[Yt+k|Ωt−1]. Based on the value of the threshold variable in this
simulation, the VAR coeﬃcients are allowed to change according to the two regimes.
To avoid inducing asymmetries from the draws of ut+j we repeat each simulation with
the inverted sequence of −ut+j. In order to obtain E[Yt+k|Ωt−1, ut] we repeat the
procedure using the same random shocks plus an additional perturbation in period t
which is constructed from a structural shock to a selected variable using the recursive
identiﬁcation assumption. The diﬀerence of these two simulated time-series is the
generalized impulse response function. This procedure is repeated seperately for each
set of initial observations from each regime using 500 draws of random shock series.
Figures 2 - 4 show these impulse responses averaged over all initial observations for each
of the two regimes. The procedure used to derive these result diﬀers from the approach
in Balke (2000) by the construction of the structural shocks’ contemporaneous impact
from the regime-dependent variance-covariance matrices of the VAR residuals.
« Insert Figure 2 »
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« Insert Figure 3 »
« Insert Figure 4 »
The impulse responses in Figures 2 - 4 are constructed for the speciﬁcation in Panel
B from Table 1 and an inﬂation threshold of 4.85 percent. The Figures present the
dynamic responses of output, inﬂation and monetary policy dependent on the starting
regime to four diﬀerent shock sizes: a positive two-standard-deviations shock, a positive
one-standard deviation shock, a negative one-standard deviation shock, and a negative
two-standard-deviations shock. The structural shocks have been scaled to their size in
the high inﬂation regime. In fact, the shocks are signiﬁcantly larger in the high inﬂation
regime but scaling the shocks to identical size facilitates the comparison of the impulse
response functions.6 The median Federal Funds Rate shock in the high inﬂation regime
is almost three times as large as in the low inﬂation regime, the inﬂation shock about
50 percent larger and the output shock is about 25 percent larger. Note however, that
these diﬀerences might be the result of shifts in the dynamic relationships between the
VAR variables (Benati and Surico, 2009).
Asymmetries in the responses to the negative and positive shocks result from diﬀerences
in the the model switching between the regimes in the adjustment after the diﬀerent
shocks.
In both columns in Figure 2 the responses to the Federal Funds Rate shocks of various
sizes in Figure 2 are symmetric. This is a sign for only negligible diﬀerences in regime
switching being caused by the diﬀerently sized shocks. Only after six to seven quarters
inﬂation responds strongly and in the right direction in the high inﬂation regime but
the response is quicker and much more pronounced in the low inﬂation regime. Output
growth shows a quick hump-shaped reaction to the Federal Funds Rate shock but the
response is much more pronounced if the economy starts in the high inﬂation regime.
The Federal Funds Rate’s reaction to its own shock is more persistent in the low
6For similar results, see e.g. Canova and Gambetti (2009), Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006),
and Stock and Watson (2003).
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inﬂation regime.
Little evidence for diﬀerences in regime switching after shocks is provided by Figure
4 for the adjustment of the U.S. economy to the shock to GDP growth as most of
the impulse responses are symmetric for same sized shocks. Important across starting
regime diﬀerences are obtained for the inﬂation rate and for the Federal Funds Rate.
Although the overall pattern of the Federal Funds Rate Response is similar in both
columns the initial rise in the Federal Funds Rate is temporarily reversed in the fourth
quarter after the shock if the economy starts in the high inﬂation regime. The increase
in the inﬂation rate after a positive shock to output growth is much more persistent if
the economy is initially in the low inﬂation regime.
The results in Figure 3 represent pronounced asymmetries in the dynamic adjustment
of output growth to the inﬂation shock and a stronger reaction of output growth in the
high inﬂation regime. The inﬂation rate reverts to the baseline path after about three
years in the high inﬂation regime while it remains persistenly above it if the economy
started in the low inﬂation regime, possibly due to the inﬂation shock enforcing a
persistent regime switch.
Figure 5 provides information on the importance of the diﬀerent structural shocks in
causing switches between the two regimes. Each ﬁgure in the left column displays the
probability of the economy being in the high inﬂation regime after having started in
the high inﬂation regime and being subject to an exogenous shock. The right column
shows the probabilities for the high inﬂation regime when the economy starts in the low
inﬂation regime. The probabilities are constructed from the simulations underlying the
generalized impulse response functions. For each initial set of observations from either
regime the VAR is simulated 500 times using randomly drawn residuals and allowing
the VAR coeﬃcients to change depending on the lagged inﬂation rate being above or
below the threshold. Figure 9 presents the average frequencies of the economy being
in the high inﬂation regime k periods after being subject to a structural shock to one
of the variables. The solid lines show the frequencies which result from simulating the
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nonlinear system with just the bootstrapped residuals. The other two lines represent
the frequencies derived from combining the bootstrapped residuals with a structural
shock of plus or minus two standard deviations to one of the variables in k = 0.7
The likelihood of the economy switching into the high inﬂation regime after beginning
in the low inﬂation state is small but non-neglibile even in the absence of structural
shocks and rises to about 25% (right column). The strongest eﬀects on these probabil-
ities can be observed for the inﬂation shock with a large positive shock substantially
increasing the likelihood for the high inﬂation regime. The other shocks have only small
eﬀects on the regime probabilities if the economy starts in the low inﬂation regime.
The probabilities in the left column show the high inﬂation regime to be highly persis-
tent as well. The probability of the economy being in the high inﬂation regime declines
only slowly to about 50%. As in the case of the low inﬂation regime these probabilities
are noticably aﬀected by inﬂation shocks but shocks to commodity price inﬂation and
to the Federal Funds Rate have also sizable eﬀects on the regime probabilities. Overall,
apart from the inﬂation shocks, the eﬀects of unexpected disturbances on the persis-
tence of the two regimes are relatively small. Even relatively large shocks have only
very limited power to force the economy out of a speciﬁc regime or to remain within
it.
« Insert Figure 5 »
3.3 Historical decompositions
Balke (2000) proposes a decomposition of the historical time series similar to the stan-
dard historical decomposition of a VAR but taking into account the non-linearity im-
plied by the threshold eﬀects. The ﬁrst element of this decomposition is a a k+1 period
baseline forecast of Y : E [Yt+k|Ωt−1], where the information set Ωt−1 consists of all ob-
servations on Y from period t− 1 and before. The contribution of the i-th structural
7The shocks again are scaled to the size of the shocks in the high inﬂation regime.
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shock to the forecast error for Y is deﬁned by the change in forecast function(CFF)
CFF (Ωt−1, k, i) = E
[
Yt+k|Ωt−1, uit, uit+1, . . . , uit+k
]− E [Yt+k|Ωt−1] , (3)
where uit+j is the estimate of the i-th structural shock in period t + j. Due to the
nonlinearity of the TVAR the sum of the individual CFFs does not necessarily add up
to the k + 1-period forecast error for Y . Hence, Balke (2000) deﬁnes a remainder term
as
RM(Ωt−1, k) = Yt+k − E [Yt+k|Ωt−1]−
N∑
i=1
CFF (Ωt−1, k, i). (4)
Figures 6 - 8 show these decompositions for the (k = 12) forecast errors of output
growth, inﬂation, and the Federal Funds Rate. Each graph shows the contributions
of three selected structural shocks and of the remainder term to the forecast error of
the variable in question. The shading indicates the period in which the high inﬂation
regime prevailed.
All Figures show that the contributions of Federal Funds Rate and inﬂation shocks
were much larger during the high inﬂation regime. The decline of the contributions
of output growth shocks in the low inﬂation regime is less pronounced than that of
the other two shocks. The remainder is mostly relevant for the high inﬂation regime.
The reason for this is that the remainder term is important only if unexpected shocks
cause the economy to switch between regimes or prevent a regime switch predicted
in the baseline forecast from ocurring. As shown in Figure 5 the economy is likely to
remain in the low inﬂation regime unless being subject to very large shocks. Hence, the
remainder is unimportant for the period following the mid-1980s in which the economy
settled down in the low inﬂation regime and the shocks were not large enough to induce
regime shifts. In the high inﬂation regime, the remainder is an important element in
explaining the forecast errors of all three variables, particularly for the Federal Funds
Rate (Figure 6). Mostly, the remainder has a negative eﬀect on the forecast errors
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indicating that the non-linear transmission of shocks tended to yield lower realized
values of output growth, inﬂation and the Federal Funds Rate compared to a model
with purely linear dynamics.
Also, in the high inﬂation regime, a sequence of large positive forecast errors for the
Federal Funds Rate and the inﬂation rate can be attributed to structural shocks to
inﬂation. Apart from inﬂation shocks sizable monetary policy shocks were the second
major course of Federal Funds Rate forecast errors (Figure 6). Monetary policy shocks
were generally of less importance for inﬂation forecast errors than inﬂation shocks
except for the early 1970s when Federal Funds Rate shocks pushed the actual inﬂation
rate strongly upward (Figure 7). A substantial part of positive forecast errors in output
growth is driven by frequent shocks to output growth itself. Less frequent inﬂation and
Federal Funds Rate shocks are important for output forecast errors as well.
« Insert Figure 6 »
« Insert Figure 7 »
« Insert Figure 8 »
3.4 Counterfactual simulations
Figures 2 - 4 highlighted some important diﬀerences between the macroeconomic dy-
namics in both regimes. An interesting question is what role these diﬀerent dynamics
play in sustaining the economy in one of the two regimes, i.e. in determining the regime
probabilities. We investigate the importance of changes in the various structural equa-
tions in counterfactual simulations by interchanging one selected structurally identiﬁed
equation of the VAR between the two regimes.8
Figure 9 shows that interchanging the monetary policy reaction function does aﬀect the
8Related to this approach are Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) who study the eﬀects of
changes in the Federal Reserve’s reaction function on causing the “Great Moderation”.
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probabilities of the economy being in the high inﬂation regime very little. The Figure
combines the results from Figure 5 with simulated frequencies for the VAR with the
interchanged Federal Funds Rate equation under the no-structural shock assumption
(solid line). The probability of the economy remaining in the high inﬂation regime does
not decline in the left column indicating that the monetary policy reaction function
from the low inﬂation regime does not aﬀect the likelihood of the economy exiting the
high inﬂation state. Since the probability of the inﬂation regime in the right column
increases only slightly the Fed’s reaction function from the high inﬂation regime is not
a major source of pushing the economy from the low into the high inﬂation state.
Figure 10 displays the corresponding results for switching the output growth equation
between the two regimes. The results are similar to those in Figure 9 with the change
in the output equation causing a slighly stronger rise in the probabilities in the high
inﬂation regime in the left column by about 10 percentage points and slightly lower
probabilities in the right column. Finally, Figure 11 shows that changes in inﬂation
dynamics between the two regimes are very important for the regime probabilities.
The probabilities of the economy remaining in the high inﬂation regime (left column)
decline substantially by about 25 percentage points. These results suggestare evidence
that changes in output and inﬂation dynamics have been much more imporant than
changes in the monetary policy reaction function in forcing the U.S. economy from the
high into the low inﬂation regime.
« Insert Figure 9 »
« Insert Figure 10 »
« Insert Figure 11 »
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4 Discussion
The results presented in this paper show strong evidence for important non-linearities
and regime-dependence in standard VAR models commonly used in the analysis of
U.S. macroeconomic dynamics. The low inﬂation regime endogenously determined by
the threshold model coincides with the period of decreased macroeconomic volatility in
the U.S. It has been argued whether the decline in output and inﬂation volatility was
caused by improvements in the Fed’s monetary policy (“good policy”), by a reduction
in shocks to the U.S. economy (“good luck”) (e.g. Gordon, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Sims
and Zha, 2006; Stock and Watson, 2003), or by changes in the structure of the U.S.
economy.
In support of the “good luck” we ﬁnd that the structural shocks to output and inﬂa-
tion were much larger in the high inﬂation regime than in the low inﬂation regime.
However, the size of the policy shock in the low inﬂation regime also is only about a
third of its size in the other regime. This indicates that in the low inﬂation regime
the Fed followed a more systematic monetary policy and deviated less from its policy
reaction function, i.e. monetary policy in the U.S. became more predictable (see also
e.g. Canova and Gambetti, 2009). The interpretation of these results is, however, not
straightforward as Benati and Surico (2009) argue that such changes might themselves
be caused by policy shifts.
We have highlighted some qualitative diﬀerences in generalized impulse responses de-
pending on the economy being initially in the high or low inﬂation regime. These
diﬀerences result from the interaction of the changes within each individual structural
equation with all the other equations in the VAR and this makes it diﬃcult to dis-
entangle the factors driving the diﬀerences in the impulse responses. Furthermore,
as Benati and Surico (2009) show it is generally diﬃcult for identiﬁed VARs to pick
up a change in a single structural equation by comparing impulse response functions.
Hence, we focused on counterfactual simulations studying how the regime-dependent
structural equations in the VAR aﬀected the regime probabilities. Our results show
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that substantial declines in the probability of the economcy remaining in the high in-
ﬂation regime were caused by changes in the dynamics of output and inﬂation but not
by the change in the monetary policy reaction function. This indicates that changes to
the structural relationships in the U.S. economy have been most important in bringing
about the transition from a high to a low inﬂation regime as argued, for example, by
Giannone et al. (2008).
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Figure 1: Lagged inﬂation and estimated inﬂation threshold
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Figure 2: Generalized impulse responses to monetary policy conditional on initial
regime. (Shocks: ± 2SD (solid), ± 1SD (dotted))
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Figure 3: Generalized impulse responses to inﬂation conditional on initial regime.
(Shocks: ± 2SD (solid), ± 1SD (dotted))
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Figure 4: Generalized impulse responses to output growth conditional on initial regime.
(Shocks: ± 2SD (solid), ± 1SD (dotted))
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Figure 5: Probability of high inﬂation regime conditional on starting regime.
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Figure 6: Forecast error in Federal Funds Rate attributed to shocks during previous
twelve quarters.
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Figure 7: Forecast error in inﬂation attributed to shocks during previous twelve quar-
ters.
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Figure 8: Forecast error in output growth attributed to shocks during previous twelve
quarters.
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Figure 9: Probability of high inﬂation regime conditional on starting regime. Federal
Funds Rate equation interchanged (solid line).
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Figure 10: Probability of high inﬂation regime conditional on starting regime. Output
equation interchanged (solid line).
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Figure 11: Probability of high inﬂation regime conditional on starting regime. Inﬂation
equation interchanged (solid line).
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